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Abstract
This article reviews the history of digital computation, and in-
vestigates just how far the concept of computation can be taken. In
particular, I address the question of whether the universe itself is in
fact a giant computer, and if so, just what kind of computer it is. I
will show that the universe can be regarded as a giant quantum com-
puter. The quantum computational model of the universe explains a
variety of observed phenomena not encompassed by the ordinary laws
of physics. In particular, the model shows that the the quantum com-
putational universe automatically gives rise to a mix of randomness
and order, and to both simple and complex systems.
1 Introduction
It is no secret that over the last fifty years the world has undergone a
paradigm shift in both science and technology. Until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the dominant paradigm in both science and technology was that of
energy: over the previous centuries, the laws of physics had been developed
to understand the nature of energy and how it could be transformed. In con-
cert with progress in physics, the technology of the industrial revolution put
the new understanding of energy to use for manufacturing and transporta-
tion. In the mid-twentieth century, a new revolution began. This revolution
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was based not on energy, but on information. The new science of informa-
tion processing, of which Turing was one of the primary inventors, spawned a
technology of information processing and computation. This technology gave
rise to novel forms and applications of computation and communication. The
rapid spread of information processing technologies, in turn, has ignited an
explosion of scientific and social inquiry. The result is a paradigm shift of
how we think about the world at its most fundamental level. Energy is still
an important ingredient of our understanding of the universe, of course, but
information has attained a conceptual and practical status equal to – and fre-
quently surpassing – that of energy. Our new understanding of the universe
is not in terms of the driving power of force and mass. Rather, the world we
see around us arises from a dance between equal partners, information and
energy, where first one takes the lead and then the other. The bit meets the
erg, and the result is the universe.
At bottom, the information that makes up the universe is not just ordi-
nary classical information (bits). Rather, it is quantum information (qubits).
Consequently, the computational model that applies the universe at its small-
est and most fundamental level is not conventional digital computation, but
quantum computation [1]. The strange and weird aspects of quantum me-
chanics infect the universe at its very beginning, and – as will be seen –
provide the mechanism by which the universe generates its peculiar mix of
randomness, order, and complexity .
2 Digital computation before Turing
Before describing how the universe can be modeled as a quantum computer,
and how that quantum computational model of the universe explains previ-
ously unexplained features, we review computation and computational mod-
els of the universe in general.
Alan Turing played a key role in the paradigm shift from energy to in-
formation: his development of a formal theory of digital computation made
him one of the most influential mathematicians of the twentieth century. It
is fitting, therefore, to praise him. Curiously, however, Turing’s seminal role
in a global scientific and technological revolution also leads to the tempta-
tion to over-emphasize his contributions. We human beings have a sloppy,
if not outright bad habit of assigning advances to a few ‘great men.’ I call
this habit the Pythagoras syndrome, after the tendency in the western world
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to assign all pre-fourth century B.C.E. mathematics to Pythagoras without
regard to actual origins. In evaluating Turing’s contributions, we should be
careful not to fall victim to the Pythagoras syndrome, if only to give full
credit to his actual contributions, which were specific and great.
Computing machines are not a modern invention [2]: the abacus was
invented in Babylon more than four thousand years ago. Analog, geared, in-
formation processing mechanisms were developed in China and Greece thou-
sands of years ago, and attained considerable sophistication in the hands of
medieval Islamic philosophers. John Napier’s seventeenth century mechani-
cal implementation of logarithms (‘Napier’s bones’) was the precursor of the
slide rule. The primary inventor of the modern digital computer, however,
was Charles Babbage. In 1812, Babbage had the insight that the calculations
carried out by mathematicians could be broken down into sequences of less
complicated steps, each of which could be carried out by a machine [3] –
note the strong similarity to Turing’s insight into the origins of the Turing
machine more than a century later. The British government fully appreci-
ated the potential impact of possessing a mechanical digital computer, and
funded Babbage’s work at a high level. During the 1820s he designed and
attempted to build a series of prototype digital computers that he called ‘dif-
ference engines.’ Nineteenth century manufacturing tolerances turned out to
be insufficiently precise to construct the the all-mechanical difference engines,
however. The first large-scale computing project consumed over seventeen
thousand pounds sterling of the British taxpayers’ money, a princely expen-
diture for pure research at the time. Like many computing projects since, it
failed.
Had they been constructed, difference engines would have been able to
compute general polynomial functions, but they would not have been capable
of what Turing termed universal digital computation. After the termination
of funding for the difference engine project, Babbage turned his efforts to the
design of an ‘analytic engine.’ Programmed by punched cards like a Jacquard
loom, the analytic engine would have been a universal digital computer. The
mathematician Ada Lovelace devised a program for the analytic engine to
compute Bernoulli numbers, thereby earning the title of the world’s first
computer programmer.
The insights of Babbage and Lovelace occurred more than a century be-
fore the start of the information processing revolution. Turing was born in
the centenary of the year in which Babbage had his original insight. The
collection in which this paper appears could equally be dedicated to the two-
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hundredth anniversary of Babbage’s vision. But scientific history is written
to celebrate winners (see Pythagoras, above). Turing ‘won’ the title of the
inventor of the digital computer because his insights played a direct role in
the vision of the creators of the first actual physical computers in the mid-
twentieth century. The science fiction genre known as ‘steampunk’ speculates
how the world might have evolved if nineteenth century technology had been
up to the task of constructing the difference and analytical engines. (Per-
haps the best-known example of the steampunk genre is William Gibson and
Bruce Sterling’s novel, ‘The Difference Engine’ [4].)
The mathematical development of digital logic did not occur until af-
ter Babbage’s mechanical development. It was not until the 1830s and 1840s
that the British logician Augustus de Morgan and the mathematician George
Boole developed the bit-based logic on which current digital computation is
based. Indeed, had Babbage been aware of this development at the time, the
physical construction of the difference and analytic engines might have been
easier to accomplish, as Boolean, bit-based operations are more straight-
forward to implement mechanically than base-ten operations. The relative
technological simplicity of bit-based operations would play a key role in the
development of electronic computers.
By the time that Turing began working on the theory of computation,
Babbage’s efforts to construct actual digital computers were a distant mem-
ory. Turing’s work had its direct intellectual antecedents in the contentious
arguments on the logical and mathematical basis of set theory that were
stirred up at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the end of the
nineteenth century, the German mathematician David Hilbert proposed an
ambitious programme to axiomatize the whole of mathematics. In 1900, he
famously formulated this programme at the International Congress of Math-
ematicians in Paris as a challenge to all mathematicians – a collection of
twenty three problems whose solution he felt would lead to a complete, ax-
iomatic theory not just of mathematics, but of physical reality. Despite or
because of its grand ambition to establish the logical foundations of math-
ematical thought, cracks began to appear in Hilbert’s programme almost
immediately. The difficulties arose at the most fundamental level, that of
logic itself. Logicians and set theorists such as Gottfried Frege and Bertrand
Russell worked for decades to make set theory consistent, but the net result
of their work was call into question the logical foundations of set theory itself.
In 1931, just when the efforts of mathematicians such as John von Neumann
had appeared to patch up those cracks, Kurt Go¨del published his beautiful
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but disturbing incompleteness theorems, showing that any system of logic
that is powerful enough to describe the natural numbers is fundamentally
incomplete in the sense that there exist well-formulated proposition within
the system that cannot be resolved using the system’s axioms [5]. By ef-
fectively destroying Hilbert’s programme, Go¨del’s startling result jolted the
mathematical community into novel ways of approaching the very notion of
what logic was.
3 Digital computation concurrent with Tur-
ing
Turing’s great contribution to logic can be thought of as the rejection of
logic as a Platonic ideal, and the redefinition logic as a process. Turing’s
famous paper of 1936, ‘On Computable Numbers with an application to
the Entscheidungsproblem,’ showed that the process of performing Boolean
logic could be implemented by an abstract machine [6], subsequently called
a Turing machine. Turing’s machine was an abstraction of a mathematician
performing a calculation by thinking and writing on pieces of paper. The
machine has a ‘head’ to do the thinking, and a ‘tape’ divided up in squares
to form the machine’s memory. The head has a finite number of possible
states, as does each square. At each step, in analogy to the mathematician
looking at the piece of paper in front of her, the head reads the state of the
square on which it sits. Then, in analogy to thinking and writing on the
paper, the head changes its state and the state of the square. The updating
occurs as a function of the head’s current state and the state of the square.
Finally, in analogy to the mathematician either taking up a new sheet of
paper or referring back to one on which she has previously written, the head
moves one square to the left of right, and the process begins again.
Turing was able to show that such machines were very powerful comput-
ing devices in principle. In particular, he proved the existence of ‘universal’
Turing machines, which were capable of simulating the action of any other
Turing machine, no matter how complex the actions of its head and squares.
Unbenownst to Turing, the American mathematician Alonzo Church had
previously arrived at a purely formal logical description of the idea of com-
putability [7], the so-called Lambda calculus. At the same time as Turing,
Emil Post devised a mechanistic treatment of logical problems. The three
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methods were all formally equivalent, but it was Turing’s that proved the
most accessible.
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of Turing’s mechanistic formulation
of logic was how it dealt with the self-contradictory and incomplete aspects
of logic raised by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. Go¨del’s theorems arise
from the ability of logical systems to have self-referential statements – they
are a formalization of the ancient ‘Cretan liar paradox,’ in which a statement
declares itself to be false. If the statement is true, then it is false; if it is
false, then it is true. Regarding proof as a logical process, Go¨del restated
the paradox as a statement that declares that it can’t be proved to be true.
There are two possibilities. If the statement is false, then it can be proved to
be true – but if a false statement can be proved to be true, then the entire
system of logic is inconsistent. If the statement is true, then it can’t be
proved to be true, and the logical system is incomplete.
In Turing’s formulation, logical statements about proofs are translated
into actions of machines. The self-referential statements of Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorems then translate into statements about a universal Turing
machine that is programmed to answer questions about its own behavior. In
particular, Turing showed that no Turing machine could answer the question
of when a Turing machine ‘halts’ – i.e., gives the answer to some question.
If such a machine existed, then it would be straightforward to construct a
related machine that halts only when it fails to halt. In other words, the
simplest possible question one can ask of a digital computer – whether it
gives any output at all – cannot be computed!
The existence of universal Turing machines, together with their intrinsic
limitation due to self-contradictory behavior as in the halting problem, has
profound consequences for the behavior of existing computers. In particular,
current electronic computers are effectively universal Turing machines. Their
universal nature expresses itself in the fact that it is possible to write software
that can be compiled to run on any digital computer, no matter whether it
is made by HP, Lenovo, or Apple. The power of universal Turing machines
manifests itself in the remarkable power and flexibility of digital computa-
tion. This power is expressed in the so-called Church-Turing hypothesis,
which states that any effectively calculable function can be computed using
a universal Turing machine. The intrinsically self-contradictory nature of
Turing machines and the halting problem manifest themselves in the intrin-
sically annoying and frustrating behavior of digital computers – the halting
problem implies that there is no systematic way of debugging a digital com-
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puter. No matter what one does, there will always be situations where the
computer exhibits surprising and unexpected behavior (e.g., the ‘blue screen
of death’).
Concurrent with the logical, abstract development of the notion of com-
putation, including Turing’s abstract machine, engineers and scientists were
pursuing the construction of actual digital computers. In Germany in 1936,
Konrad Zuse designed the Z-1, a mechanical calculator whose program was
written on perforated 35mm film. In 1937, Zuse expanded the design to al-
low universal digital computation a la Turing. When completed in 1938, the
Z-1 functioned poorly due to mechanical imprecision, the same issue that
plagued Babbage’s difference engine more than a century earlier. By 1941,
Zuse had constructed the Z-3, an electronic computer capable of universal
digital computation. Because of its essentially applied nature, and because it
was kept secret during the second world war, Zuse’s work received less credit
for its seminal nature than was its due (see the remark above on winner’s
history).
Meanwhile, in 1937, Claude Shannon’s MIT master’s thesis, ‘A Symbolic
Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits,’ showed how any desired Boolean
function – including those on which universal digital computation could be
based – could be implemented using electronic switching circuits [8]. This
work had a profound influence on the construction of electronic computers
in the United States and Great Britain over the next decades.
4 Digital computation post-Turing
Turing’s ideas on computation had immediate impact on the construction of
actual digital computers. While doing his Ph.D. at Princeton in 1937, Turing
himself constructed simple electronic models of Turing machines. The real
impetus for the development of actual digital computers came with the onset
of the second world war. Calculations for gunnery and bombing could be
speeded up electronically. Most relevant to Turing’s work, however, was the
use of electronic calculators for the purpose of cryptanalysis During the war,
Turing became the premier code-breaker for the British cryptography effort.
The first large-scale electronic computer, the Colossus, was constructed to
aid this effort. In the United States, IBM constructed the Mark I at Har-
vard, the second programmable computer after Zuse’s Z-3, and used it to
perform ballistic calculations. Zuse himself had not remained idle: he cre-
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ated the world’s first computer start-up, designed the follow-up to the Z-3,
the Z-4, and wrote the first programming language. The end of the war saw
the construction of the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer, or
ENIAC.
To build a computer requires and architecture. Two of the most influ-
ential proposals for computer architectures at the end of the war were the
Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer, or EDVAC, authored by
von Neumann, and Turing’s Automatic Computing Engine, or ACE. Both
of these proposals implemented what is called a ‘von Neumann’ computer
architecture, in which program and data are stored in the same memory
bank. Stored program architectures were anticipated by Babbage, implicit
in Turing’s original paper, and had been developed previously by J. Presper
Eckert and John Mauchly in their design for the ENIAC. The Pythagoras
syndrome, however, assigns their development to von Neumann, who himself
would have been unlikely to claim authorship.
This ends our historical summary of conventional digital computation.
The last half century has seen vast expansion of devices, techniques, and
architectures notably the development of the transistor and integrated cir-
cuits. But the primary elements of computation – programmable systems to
perform digital logic – were all in place by 1950.
5 The computing universe
The physical universe bears little resemblance to the collection of wires, tran-
sistors, and electrical circuitry that make up a conventional digital computer.
How then, can one claim that the universe is a computer? The answer lies
in the definition of computation, of which Turing was the primary developer.
According to Turing, a universal digital computer is a system that can be
programmed to perform any desired sequence of logical operations. Turing’s
invention of the universal Turing machine makes this notion precise. The
question of whether the universe is itself a universal digital computer can
be broken down into two parts: (I) Does the universe compute? and (II)
Does the universe do nothing more than compute? More precisely, (I) Is the
universe capable of performing universal digital computation in the sense
of Turing? That is, can the universe or some part of it be programmed to
simulate a universal Turing machine? (II) Can a universal Turing machine
efficiently simulate the dynamics of the universe itself?
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At first the answers to these questions might appear, straightforwardly, to
be Yes. When we construct electronic digital computers, we are effectively
programming some piece of the universe to behave like a universal digital
computer, capable of simulating a universal Turing machine. Similarly, the
Church-Turing hypothesis implies, that any effectively calculable physical
dynamics – including the known laws of physics, and any laws that may be
discovered in the – can be computed using a digital computer.
But the straightforward answers are not correct. First, to simulate a uni-
versal Turing machine requires a potentially infinite supply of memory space.
In Turing’s original formulation, when a Turing machine reaches the end of
its tape, new blank squares can always be added: the tape is ‘indefinitely ex-
tendable.’ Whether the universe that we inhabit provides us with indefinitely
extendable memory is an open question of quantum cosmology, and will be
discussed further below. So a more accurate answer to the first question is
‘Maybe.’ The question of whether or not infinite memory space is available
is not so serious, as one can formulate notions of universal computation with
limited memory. After all, we treat our existing electronic computers as uni-
versal machines even though they have finite memory (until, of course, we run
out of disc space!). The fact that we possess computers is strong empirical
evidence that laws of physics support universal digital computation.
The straightforward answer to question (II) is more doubtful. Although
the outcomes of any calculable laws of physics can almost certainly be sim-
ulated on a universal Turing machine, it is an open question whether this
simulation can be performed efficiently in the sense that a relatively small
amount of computational resources are devoted to simulating what happens
in a small volume of space and time. The current theory of computational
complexity suggests that the answer to the second question is ‘Probably not.’
An even more ambitious programme for the computational theory of the
universe is the question of architecture. The observed universe possesses the
feature that the laws of physics are local – they involve only interactions
between neighboring regions of space and time. Moreover, these laws are
homogeneous and isotropic, in that they appear to take the same form in
all observed regions of space and time. The computational version of a ho-
mogeneous system with local laws is a cellular automaton, a digital system
consisting of cells in regular array. Each cell possesses a finite number of
possible states, and is updated as a function of its own state and those of its
neighbors. Cellular automata were proposed by von Neumann and by the
mathematician Stanislaw Ulam in the 1940s, and used by them to investi-
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gate mechanisms of self-reproduction [9]. Von Neumann and Ulam showed
that cellular automata were capable of universal computation in the sense of
Turing. In the 1960s, Zuse and computer scientist Edward Fredkin proposed
that cellular automata could be used as the basis for the laws of physics –
i.e., the universe is nothing more or less than a giant cellular automaton [10].
More recently, this idea was promulgated by Stephen Wolfram.
The idea that the universe is a giant cellular automaton is the strong ver-
sion of the statement that the universe is a computer. That is, not only does
the universe compute, and only compute, but also if one looks at the ‘guts’
of the universe – the structure of matter at its smallest scale – then those
guts consist of nothing more than bits undergoing local, digital operations.
The strong version of the statement that the universe is a computer can be
phrased as the question, (III) ‘Is the universe a cellular automaton?’ As will
now be seen, the answer to this question is No. In particular, basic facts
about quantum mechanics prevent the local dynamics of the universe from
being reproduced by a finite, local, classical, digital dynamics.
6 Classical digital devices can’t reproduce quan-
tum mechanics efficiently
Quantum mechanics is the physical theory that describes how systems behave
at their most fundamental scales. It was studying von Neumann’s book [11]
The mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics that inspired Turing to
work on mathematics [12]. (In particular, Turing was interested in reconciling
questions of determinism and free will with the apparently indeterministic
nature of quantum mechanics.) Quantum mechanics is well-known for ex-
hibiting strange, counter-intuitive features. Chief amongst these features is
the phenomenon known as entanglement, which Einstein termed ‘spooky ac-
tion at a distance’ (spukhafte Fernwirkung). In fact, entanglement does not
engender non-locality in the sense of non-local interactions or superluminal
communication. However, a variety of theorems from von Neumann to Bell
and beyond show that the types of correlations implicit in entanglement can-
not be described by classical local models involving hidden variables [13]. In
particular, such quantum correlations cannot be reproduced by local classical
digital models such as cellular automata. Non-local classical hidden variable
models can reproduce the correlations of quantum mechanics, but only at the
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by introducing either superluminal communication, or a very large amount of
classical information to reproduce the behavior of a single quantum bit. Ac-
cordingly, the answer to question (III), is the universe a cellular automaton,
is ‘No.’
The inability of classical digital systems to cope with entanglement also
seems to prevent ordinary computers from simulating quantum systems ef-
ficiently. Merely to represent the state of a quantum system with N sub-
systems, e.g., N nuclear spins, requires O(2N) bits on a classical computer.
To represent how that state evolves requires the exponentiation of a 2N by
2N matrix. Although it is conceivable that exponential compression tech-
niques could be found that would allow a classical computer to simulate a
generic quantum system efficiently, none are known. So the currently ac-
cepted answer to question (II), can a Turing machine simulate a quantum
system efficiently, is ‘Probably not.’
7 Quantum computing
The difficulty that classical computers have reproducing quantum effects
makes it difficult to sustain the idea that the universe might at bottom be
a classical computer. Quantum computers, by definition, are good at re-
producing quantum effects, however [14]. Let’s investigate the question of
whether the universe might be, at bottom, a quantum computer [1].
A quantum computer is a computer that uses quantum effects such as su-
perposition and entanglement to perform computations in ways that classical
computers cannot. Quantum computers were proposed by Paul Benioff in
1980 [15]. The notion of a quantum Turing machine that used quantum su-
perposition to perform computations in a novel way was proposed by David
Deutsch in 1985 [16]. For a decade or so, quantum computation remained
something of a curiosity. No one had a particularly good application for them,
and no one had the least idea how to build them. The situation changed in
1994, when Peter Shor showed that a relatively modestly sized quantum
computer, containing a few thousand logical quantum bits or ‘qubits,’ and
capable of performing around a million coherent operations, could be used
to factor large numbers and so break public key cryptosystems such as RSA
[17]. The previous year, Lloyd had showed how quantum computers could be
constructed by applying electromagnetic pulses to arrays of coupled quantum
systems [18]. The resulting parallel quantum computer is in effect a quantum
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cellular automaton. In 1995, Ignacio Cirac and Peter Zoller showed how ion
traps could be used to implement quantum computation [19].
Since then, a wide variety of designs for quantum computers have been
proposed. Further quantum algorithms have been developed, and prototype
quantum computers have been constructed and used to demonstrate sim-
ple quantum algorithms. This allows us to begin addressing the question of
whether the universe is a quantum computer. If we ‘quantize’ our three ques-
tions, the first one, (Q1) ‘Does the universe allow quantum computation?’
has the provisional answer, ‘Yes.’ As before, the question of whether the uni-
verse affords a potentially unlimited supply of quantum bits remains open.
Moreover, it is not clear that human beings currently possess the technical
ability to build large scale quantum computers capable of code breaking.
However, from the perspective of determining whether the universe supports
quantum computation, it is enough that the laws of physics allow it.
Now quantize the second question. (Q2) ‘Can a quantum computer effi-
ciently simulate the dynamics of the universe?’ Because they operate using
the same principles that apply to nature at fundamental scales, quantum
computers – though difficult to construct – represent a way of processing in-
formation that is closer to the way that nature processes information at the
microscale. In 1982, Richard Feynman suggested that quantum devices could
function as quantum analog computers to simulate the dynamics of extended
quantum systems [20]. In 1996, Lloyd developed a quantum algorithm for
implementing such universal quantum simulators [21]. The Feynman-Lloyd
results show that, unlike classical computers, quantum computers can sim-
ulate efficiently any quantum system that evolves by local interactions, in-
cluding for example the standard model of elementary particles. While no
universally accepted theory of quantum gravity currently exists, as long as
that theory involves local interactions between quantized variables, then it
can be efficiently simulated on a quantum computer. So the answer to the
quantized question 2 is ‘Yes.’
There are of course subtleties to how a quantum computer can simulate
the known laws of physics. Fermions supply special problems of simulation,
which however can be overcome. A short-distance (or high-energy) cutoff in
the dynamics is required to insure that the amount of quantum information
required to simulate local dynamics is finite. However, such cutoffs – for
example, at the Planck scale – are widely expected to be a fundamental
feature of nature.
Finally, we can quantize question three: (Q3) ‘Is the universe a quantum
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cellular automaton?’ While we cannot unequivocally answer this question
in the affirmative, we note that the proofs that show that a quantum com-
puter can simulate any local quantum system efficiently immediately imply
that any homogeneous, local quantum dynamics, such as that given by the
standard model and (presumably) by quantum gravity, can be directly re-
produced by a quantum cellular automaton. Indeed, lattice gauge theories,
in Hamiltonian form, map directly onto quantum cellular automata. Accord-
ingly, all current physical observations are consistent with the theory that
the universe is indeed a quantum cellular automaton.
8 The universe as quantum computer
We saw above that basic aspects of quantum mechanics, such as entangle-
ment, make it difficult to construct a classical computational model of the
universe as a universal Turing machine or a classical cellular automaton. By
contrast, the power of quantum computers to encompass quantum dynamics
allows the construction of quantum computational models of the universe.
In particular, the Feynman-Lloyd construction allows one to map any local,
homogeneous quantum dynamics directly onto a quantum cellular automa-
ton.
The immediate question is ‘So what?’ Does the fact that the universe
is observationally indistinguishable from a giant quantum computer tell us
anything new or interesting about its behavior? The answer to this question
is a resounding ‘Yes!’ In particular, the quantum computational model of
the universe answers a question that has plagued human beings ever since
they first began to wonder about the origins of the universe, namely, Why is
the universe so ordered and yet so complex [1]?
The ordinary laws of physics tell us nothing about why the universe is
so complex. Indeed, the complexity of the universe is quite mysterious in
ordinary physics. The reason is that the laws of physics are apparently
quite simple. The known ones can be written down on the back of a tee
shirt. Moreover, the initial state of the universe appears also to have been
simple. Just before the big bang, the universe was highly flat, homogeneous,
isotropic, and almost entirely lacking in detail. Simple laws and simple initial
conditions should lead to states that are, in principle, themselves very simple.
But that is not what we see when we look out the window. Instead we see vast
variety and detail – animals and plants, houses and humans, and overhead, at
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night, stars and planets wheeling by. Highly complex systems and behaviors
abound. The quantum computational model of the universe not only explains
this complexity: it requires it to exist.
To understand why the quantum computational model necessarily gives
rise to complexity, consider the old story of monkeys typing on typewriters.
The original version of this story was proposed by the French probabilist
E´mile Borel, at the beginning of the twentieth century (for a detailed account
of the history of typing monkeys see [1]). Borel imagined a million typing
monkeys (singes dactylographes) and pointed out that over the course of
single year, the monkeys had a finite chance of producing all the texts in all
the libraries in the world. He then immediately noted that with very high
probability, they would would produce nothing but gibberish.
Consider, by contrast, the same monkeys typing into computers. Rather
than regarding the monkeys random scripts as mere texts, the computers in-
terpret them as programs, sets of instructions to perform logical operations.
At first it might seem that the computers would also produce mere gibberish
– ‘garbage in, garbage out,’ as the programmer’s maxim goes. While it is
true that many of the programs might result in garbage or error messages, it
can be shown mathematically that the monkeys have a relatively high chance
of producing complex, ordered structures. The reason is that many complex,
ordered structures can be produced from short computer programs, albeit
after lengthy calculations. Some short program will instruct the computer
to calculate the digits of pi, for example, while another will cause it to pro-
duce intricate fractals. Another will instruct the computer to evaluate the
consequences of the standard model of elementary particles, interacting with
gravity, starting from the big bang. A particularly brief program instructs
the computer to prove all possible theorems. Moreover, the shortest pro-
grams to produce these complex structures are necessarily random. If they
were not, then there would be an even shorter program that could produce
the same structure. So the monkeys, by generating random programs, are
producing exactly the right conditions to generate structures of arbitrarily
great complexity.
For this argument to apply to the universe itself, two ingredients are nec-
essary – first, a computer, and second, monkeys. But as shown above, the
universe itself is indistinguishable from a quantum computer. In addition,
quantum fluctuations – e.g., primordial fluctuations in energy density – au-
tomatically provide the random bits that are necessary to seed the quantum
computer with a random program. That is, quantum fluctuations are the
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monkeys that program the quantum computer that is the universe. Such a
quantum computing universe necessarily generates complex, ordered struc-
tures with high probability.
9 Conclusions
This article reviewed the history of computation with the goal of answering
the question, ‘Is the universe a computer?’ The inability of classical digi-
tal computers to reproduce quantum effects efficiently makes it implausible
that the universe is a classical digital system such as a cellular automa-
ton. However, all observed phenomena are consistent with the model in
which the universe is a quantum computer, e.g., a quantum cellular automa-
ton. The quantum computational model of the universe explains previously
unexplained features, most importantly, the co-existence in the universe of
randomness and order, and of simplicity and complexity.
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